The elementary threat against router discovery is that a resentful node masquerades as a router. The assailant responds to RS messages from nodes in successi~ the link requesting router discovery with bogus RA messages, giving its avow link layer address and link local
IPv6 address as a router accost. The attacker can also multicast periodic bogus RA messages, thereby spoong nodes that are listening against the RA beacon on the constituent piece. The attacker can also cause nodes that esteem selected a legitimate router as the default to globule the legitimate router by multicasting RA beacons concerning the legitimate router with a lifetime of cipher, thereby causing the victim node to pick out the attacker as the default router. Once a node has accepted the attacker as a default router, the aggressor can manipulate the victim's trafc at its convenience. Packets can be inspected, service be able to be denied, etc.
Another attack involves compromising a legalize last hop router, either by shutting the router on the ground or by taking control of it. If the after all the rest hop router is killed, nodes up~ the body the link attempt to another router for a short delay. The attacker be possible to advertise itself as a router. If a trusted router is taken upward of by an attacker, the attacker have power to then examine trafc, exactly the same while if the attacker had convinced the nodes adhering the link to accept it similar to a legitimate router in the standing. These attacks are hard to countenance against in system and protocol design.
Another assail involves compromising a legitimate last spring router, either by shutting the router below the horizon or by taking control of it. If the highest hop router is killed, nodes without ceasing the link attempt to another router back a short delay. The attacker can advertise itself as a router. If a trusted router is taken very by an attacker, the attacker be able to then examine trafc, exactly the sort as if the attacker had convinced the nodes forward the link to accept it like a legitimate router in the deposit. These attacks are hard to house against in system and protocol design.
Another to a greater degree subtle attack involves advertising false parameters in RAs, like the erroneous subnet prex or an indication that the copula requires DHCP when it really does not. A gull node that uses the false parameters instead of local IP subnet con?guration would in that case be unable to obtain IP routing purpose, or, in the case of DHCP, a bogus DHCP server could style of penmanship out the address of a fortify-in-the-middle attacker or but for this redirect trafc. This attack is uniform to the bogus router attack, but does not require the attacker to really advertise itself as a router in conduct to disrupt trafc.
